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Abstract This essay explores the practical significance of Michel Henry’s
‘‘material phenomenology.’’ Commencing with an exposition of his most basic
philosophical intuition, i.e., his insight that transcendental affectivity is the pri-
mordial mode of revelation of our selfhood, the essay then brings to light how this
intuition also establishes our relation to both the world and others. Animated by a
radical form of the phenomenological reduction, Henry’s material phenomenology
brackets the exterior world in a bid to reach the concrete interior transcendental
experience at the base of all exteriority. The essay argues that this ‘‘counter
reduction,’’ designed as a practical orientation to the world, suspends all traditional
parameters of onto(theo)logical individuation in order to rethink subjectivity in
terms of its transcendental corporeality, i.e., in terms of the invisible display of
‘‘affective flesh.’’ The development of this ‘‘metaphysics of the individual’’ anchors
his ‘‘practical philosophy’’ as he developed it—under shifting accents—throughout
his oeuvre. In particular, the essay brings into focus Henry’s reflections on
modernity, the industry of mass culture and their ‘‘barbaric’’ movements. The essay
briefly puts these cultural and political areas of Henry’s of thinking into contact with
his late ‘‘theological turn,’’ i.e., his Christological account of Life and the (inter)-
subjective self-realization to which it gives rise.
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Transcendendal corporeality
Men debased, humiliated, despised and despising themselves, trained in
school to despise themselves, to count for nothing—just particles and
molecules; admiring everything lesser than themselves and execrating
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everything that is greater than themselves. […] Men turned away from Life’s
Truth, caught in all the traps and marvels where this life is denied, ridiculed,
mimicked, simulated—absent. Men given over to the insensible, become
themselves insensible, whose eyes are as empty as a fish’s. Dazed men,
devoted to specters and spectacles that always expose their own invalidity and
bankruptcy […] Men will want to die – but not Life.1
Paul Ricœur’s oft-cited dictum that the history of phenomenology is a ‘‘history of
heresies,’’2 seems to apply in an extraordinary manner to the philosophy of Michel
Henry. While he takes up and furthers phenomenology, he nevertheless shapes it in
a way that is not only particular and critical but also quite unfamiliar. As Waldenfels
has established in his well-known work on Pha¨nomenologie in Frankreich, Henry’s
philosophical approach stands out for the fact that he is beholden to few of the
intuitions essential to phenomenology. That said, he ultimately pursues one that
possesses enormous explosive force, namely, the insight that affectivity is the most
primordial mode of revelation of both our self and the world.3 In the following, I
would like to demonstrate the explosive force this intuition takes on when it is
applied, as Henry himself has indeed done in diverse respects, to the problems of
practical philosophy and in particular the critique of culture and questions of
political philosophy. For I believe that the significance of Henry’s thought in no way
belongs solely to the theoretical register. On the contrary, it seems to me that the
force of his thought is principally discovered in its practical unfolding and
application.
For Henry, in contrast to Husserl and classical phenomenology, what is at stake is
no longer the question of how to think life on the basis of the world—or on the basis
of another transcendental horizon such as time, the body, or the other—but rather,
on the contrary, it is a question of how to think the immanent capacity of revelation
of life itself and therefore of how to think the world on the basis of life. Perhaps the
most difficult aporia in his thought consists precisely in what it means to think life.
Given such a definition of the task of phenomenology, a radical paradigm shift
from a ‘‘phenomenology of transcendence’’ to a ‘‘phenomenology of immanence’’ is
announced and thus a shift from intentionality to praxis. Hence the task of
phenomenology, rightly understood, consists in working out the immanent and, for
Henry, practical intelligibility of life as the principle or logos of appearance per se—
i.e., of all phenomenalization.4 One is inclined to ask, however, which phenom-
enology? For if phenomenology—as we see in the thematization of intentionality in
Husserl or the transcendence qua essence of the appearing of what appears in
1 Henry (2003a, p. 275).
2 Ricœur (1998, p. 156).
3 Waldenfels (1990, pp. 349–50).
4 Henry (2008a, p. 37) construes the distinction between praxis and theory as follows: ‘‘I call praxis that
knowledge [savoir] of life in which life constitutes at once the power (pouvoir) that knows and what is
known, procuring for knowledge, in an exclusive manner, its content. What characterizes, as we have
seen, such knowledge, in the absence of all ecstasis, is the fact that there is in it no possible relation to any
‘world’ whatsoever. On the contrary, I call theory that mode of knowledge that is defined by this
relation.’’ Henry calls ‘scientific knowing’ that mode of knowing that corresponds to the object relation.
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Heidegger—in fact already inquires into nothing other than the logos of appearance,
then will it not get it lost in Henry’s conception of it in a ‘‘tautological interiority’’
or ‘‘immanent autoreference’’ of life?5 We should ask what is meant by life here,
especially when ‘‘absolute life’’ is placed in scare quotes or when it capitalized and
when it is affirmed, ‘‘there is but a single and selfsame Life’’ and that it has ‘‘the
same meaning for God, for Christ, and for man’’.6 Do not such declarations signify a
surrender of phenomenology to (crypto-)theology, suggested, along with others, by
Dominique Janicaud, who counts Henry in his polemical essay on the ‘‘theological
turn’’ among the ‘‘new theologians’’?7 In order to adequately counter this all too
sweeping charge and ultimately to be able to develop the important implications of
Henry’s position for a thinking of culture and politics, we should envision what is at
play in his transformation of phenomenology into a ‘‘phenomenology of life’’: it
concerns, to foreshadow this crucial point of his discourse, the transcendental
humanitas of human beings, our inescapable destiny to be a Self, something that is
itself given in its ‘‘living flesh’’8 without owing its singularity to any kind of
transcendent principle, but that always finds itself exposed to the seductions of
transcendence, that is, by the attempt to define itself by means of a transcendent
principle. That and how such an unfathomable singularity is at play in our cultural
and political self-understanding is shown in Michel Henry’s practical writings.9
1 Turning phenomenology on its head: from intentional to ‘‘material’’
phenomenology
For Henry, the common presupposition that links classical philosophy with historical
phenomenology—from Husserl and Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty and Levinas—
consists in the fact that they think the logos of phenomena as the logos of the world. To
put it another way, they all think appearing as horizontal appearing. For this reason,
Henry believes, they are not capable of explaining how intentionality brings itself
forth, that is, how transcendence is able to transcend itself.10 In order to solve this
problem it is necessary to go back to the immemorial ground of experience, in which,
as Henry puts it, intentionality takes possession of itself, or, rather, ‘‘experiences
itself’’ (s’e´prouve soi-meme). Only in such a way of primarily giving itself to itself is it
5 Janicaud (2000, pp. 73–4).
6 Henry (2003a, p. 101).
7 Janicaud (2000, pp. 73–4). The debates concerning the status of the ‘‘turn’’ among new French
phenomenologists was unquestionably marked by a polemical tone. This polemic was not in the least
conditioned by Janicaud’s own commentary and position of ‘‘minimalist phenomenology,’’ which is
faithful to Husserl’s phenomenological rigor, and indeed so in this very book. Janicaud himself takes an
intercessional position on the diverse replies to the ‘‘theological turn’’ in an elaborate and thorough way in
La phe´nomenologie e´clate´e (Janicaud 1998). On this debate and Janicaud’s approach in particular, see
Gondek and Tengelyi (2010).
8 Henry (2000, pp. 173–80, § 23).
9 I should note that I cannot take into consideration Michel Henry’s large work on Marx (Henry 1991),
which is relevant here.
10 See Henry (2000, p. 54).
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also capable of transcending itself and moving towards the other. For Henry, the task of
a radical, i.e., ‘‘material phenomenology’’ thus consists in returning to ‘‘pure
immanence’’ and its inner ‘‘structure’’ and ‘‘dynamic.’’ Against the ‘‘ontological
monism’’11 of Western philosophy, i.e., the presupposition that ‘‘phenomenological
distance is the ontological power which gives us access to things,’’12 such a
phenomenology thematizes the ‘‘duplicity of appearing.’’13 This implies that against
manifestation—which is Henry’s term for all transcendent, ecstatic, or worldly
appearing—is pitted a pure appearing or, to be more precise, a self-appearing or auto-
revelation. The concept of duplicity underscores the fact that this distinction is no way
meant as a dichotomous comparison, but rather that what should be thought is a
foundational relationship: ultimately, Henry postulates, the essence of manifestation
is founded in nothing other than precisely this self-appearing. This does not takes
place, however, within thought, representation or reflection, but rather in the mode of
affectivity, or, stated more precisely, in the mode of auto-affection on the part of pure
phenomenological life.
For Henry the decisive presupposition of classical phenomenology thus lies in the
fact that the life of consciousness is to be realized within the horizon of exteriority,
visibility, or simply the world, i.e., in the domain of a living subjectivity that in-
tentionally exceeds itself. In such exteriority it is through intentionality that the
subject does not coincide with itself inasmuch as it always differs from itself,
fractured by the difference of the world itself. In Henry’s view it was Husserl who
first contemplated this insight about intentionality, which has been radicalized by
post-Husserl phenomenology, and has also influenced deconstruction. However,
when it is a question of thinking the proper essence of selfhood, Henry takes all of
these positions to be entirely insufficient. According to him, Husserl’s theory of
‘‘self-constitution’’ puts us on an aporetic path. It does this by privileging an
intentionality that constitutes objects within its temporal flow at the expense of a
more primal self-presencing prior to the streaming of time.14 The question that
arises here about a primordial selfhood had always remained a problem for Husserl
and classical phenomenology (and, of course, it was in no way only a
phenomenological problem). According to Henry, the task of rendering intelligible
this primal self-presencing in its passive/affective foundation was an impossible one
for Husserl to achieve because he emphasized the cognitive structure of
consciousness and its various intentional faculties (e.g., presentation, representation,
imagination).15
Henry goes back to Husserl, however, in order to pose this question in a manner
that is adequate to the task. Central for him is an early insight suggested by Husserl
in his lecture, The Idea of Phenomenology, one that is quickly forgotten and never
developed in his subsequent writings. Husserl’s insight is that nothing other than
11 Cf. Henry (1973, pp. 47–133).
12 Henry (1973, p. 63).
13 A closer examination of this difficult concept can be found in Khosrokhavar (2001).
14 See Husserl (1966, § 39).
15 It should be noted that Hume already distinguishes between these two possible ways that the essence
of selfhood can be grounded; see Tengelyi (2009, p. 401).
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pure appearance as such, hence phenomenality, is the basic theme of phenome-
nology, and therefore not the primacy of the phenomenological ‘gaze’ (Schau), nor,
more generally speaking, that of theory.16 Phenomenality here means nothing other
than the condition under which something in general is initially capable of attaining
the status of a phenomenon. We must add, however, that we can no longer appeal to
a horizon, in which the staging of the ‘‘thing itself’’ would unfold (i.e., objectivity in
Husserl, Being in Heidegger, or the ‘‘flesh of the world’’ in late Merleau-Ponty,
etc.). Rather, if one considers appearing in the dimension of its origin, particularly
in regards to such a horizon, a problem arises, namely, that as a method
phenomenology immediately loses sight of this pure appearing. This is, one might
say, its fate, insofar as it takes itself to be a process of making evident, as a mode of
making-visible (Sehen-lassen), ex-plication or a mode of rendering-manifest. To put
it in connection with traditional concepts: Henry argues that intentionality, by virtue
of its constitutive character whereby it sets phenomena within a horizon, cannot
initiate us into the proper domain of phenomenological inquiry. Intentional
consciousness—i.e., that which bears the distinction of being conscious of
something as something—is thus not primordially responsible for making the
world open to us. As a method of beholding and grasping (Schauen und Fassen),
intentional phenomenology in fact conceals the genuine phenomenological register
that Henry has in mind. Thus, in contrast to Husserl, who orders the original relation
to the world by way of intentional reflection or ‘‘consciousness of…,’’ Henry does
not. This is to say that Husserl insists that intentional life relates the self to
something different than itself. And it is through this relation that the true and only
possible ‘‘access to being’’ is possible, which renders intentionality, as Fink aptly
puts it, the central hypothesis of Husserl’s phenomenology.17
This Husserlian hypothesis, which posits consciousness, understood as origi-
narily intentional, as the genuine mode of accessing Being yields an extraordinary
phenomenological situation: if the primordial ‘‘How of givenness’’ or of the ‘‘thing
itself’’ is identified with intentional display, then the appearing of the being is
substituted for the appearing as such:
Still expressed in a language that demonstrates the close affinity between this
historical phenomenology and classical philosophy, every consciousness is a
‘consciousness of something’. Thus we have, on the one hand, the appearing
(consciousness) and, on the other hand, the something, the being. In itself the
being is foreign to appearing and thus unable to phenomenalize itself through
itself. For its part, the appearing is such that it is necessarily the appearance of
something other, of the being. Appearing turns away from itself in such a
radical and violent way that it is directed entirely to something other than
itself, namely, the outside—it is intentionality. Because appearing qua
16 See Husserl (1999, p. 24): ‘‘Every intellectual experience, indeed every experience whatsoever, can be
made into an object of pure seeing and apprehension, while it is occurring (indem es vollzogen wird). And
in this act of seeing it is an absolute givenness.’’ As to Henry, this quote shows that the mode of
intentional phenomenalization presupposes another mode of phenomenalization than seeing that takes
place from a distance, namely enactment (Vollzug).
17 Fink (1966, p. 201).
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intentionality finds itself thus essentially displaced in what it allows to appear,
appearing no longer appears, but only that which appearing lets appear within
itself: the being. As a result, the object of phenomenology, the ‘thing itself’, is
distorted in such a way that the object of phenomenology is no longer the
appearing but rather the appearing of the being and ultimately the being itself,
insofar as it appears.18
In contrast, what Henry provides is the ‘‘re-inscription of intentionality in the non-
intentional.’’ He determines the non-intentional as a ground that is ‘‘older’’ than
intentionality. Henry puts into play a radical reduction that reduces or disqualifies
the world as the horizon of intentional exhibition and site of any and all givenness.
Horizon-inscription and reduction to the ego are hereby suspended as constituents of
the phenomenon’s genesis. In regards to this methodological approach Henry speaks
of a ‘‘counter-reduction.’’19 This brings us back to the passive and affective
foundation of the self, its pure self-appearing or its pure self-revelation, which are
carried out in the ‘‘night of subjectivity,’’ in the ‘‘invisible’’ life of our affectivity.
The path from a ‘‘phenomenology of the world’’ to a ‘‘phenomenology of life,’’
from a phenomenology of ‘‘transcendence’’ to one of ‘‘immanence’’ has now been
sketched more clearly. The duplicity of appearing implied here is central for
Henry’s thought. He holds on to this duplicity against the ‘‘ontological monism’’
that reduces the field of appearing entirely to the laws of intentional display that
exhibits objects in the luminous horizon of the world. Nevertheless, for him it is not
a question of construing this duality or, rather, duplicity, as a dualism.20 His aim lies
rather in grasping the world on the basis of life, without thinking the latter—qua
nature of the subject and of Being—within the ‘‘apperceptive horizon’’ of the world
(nor therefore in that of Being, but also not in that of alterity or a mysterious ‘‘flesh
of the world,’’ etc.), but rather purely from out of its ‘‘immanent teleology.’’21 We
find this idea already in the definition Henry gives of the self in L’essence de la
manifestation:
That which is thus forever burdened with self, only this can we truly call a
Self. Herein is accomplished the movement without movement in which it
receives, as a substantial and burdensome content, that which it is; it masters
itself, arrives at itself, experiences its own profusion. The Self is the surpassing
of the Self as identical to self.22
This ‘‘ipseization’’ of the subject—as it is called in I am the Truth—takes place in
its living bodily praxis, i.e., purely in the invisible medium of its affectivity as well
as practically lived intelligibility. This suggests that we speak here of a metaphysics
of the individual, since for this reason all traditional parameters of onto(theo)
logical individuation—such as substantiality, spatio-temporality localization,
18 Henry (2003b, p. 112).
19 This concept is elaborated by Depraz (2000).
20 See Tengelyi (2009, p. 402).
21 Henry (2008a, p. 169).
22 Henry (1973, p. 473).
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self-determination, self-motivated agency (Selbstta¨tigkeit) or spontaneous self-
determination—are suspended—and this in favor of the apodicticity of an
unshakeable foundation of our practical ‘‘knowledge of life’’ (savoir de la vie) as
a purely individuated self-feeling.23
Against this background, Henry’s central thesis can be elucidated, namely, that
the mode of the self-appearing or the self-revelation of life is not the affection by
means of something foreign to consciousness, nor external (as classical philosophy
would have it), nor is it the affection by means of itself as something other in the
medium of time or the faculty of imagination (as Husserl and Heidegger would have
it), but rather the pure auto-affection of life, which is revealed in the feeling it has of
itself. Thus, Henry considers the affective auto-revelation as the ineluctable
condition that precedes all intentional relatedness and ‘‘being-toward-the-world’’ in
general. For instance, the ‘‘impressional content of the world’’ is no longer that
which fills the ‘‘meaning-bestowing’’ intentional ray, but rather—and thus runs
Henry’s thesis—to a non-intentional auto-affection of life as a pathos interior to the
ego. According to Henry this pathetic, i.e., radically passive, self-appearing
constitutes the invisible reality of life in its self-affection.
What Henry designates as auto-affection, moreover, precedes the classical distinction
between activity and passivity. It is more primordial than the passivity involved in the
suffering of an external force and also the passivity of feelings, emotions, affects, and
dispositions. Thus what is at issue is an originary, i.e., ontological passivity of
affectivity. For Henry, this originary passivity is at once passive and yet constitutive of
the ground of selfhood itself, and this represents one of the decisive thematics of his
system. For this is implied in every feeling as its ‘‘self-feeling,’’ or originarily passive
self-relationality.24 There is no difficulty in claiming that Henry’s theory of the
irrepressible pathos of auto-affection is distinct from affective states like sensation,
which exhibit an intentional or exterior relation to the world. So exterior sensations
involve a relation to something different than themselves, (to outside sensory
impressions), an affection structured by what is known as hetero-affection. For Henry,
hetero-affection, while a legitimate field of display, does not exhaust what affectivity is.
Or, to express it another way, ‘‘Henry is convinced that the events of the world are only
occasional causes of our feelings. It is our affectivity itself which makes it possible for
the world to exert an influence upon our interior life. In other words, it is, in each case,
our particular ‘attunement’ that exposes us to an affection by the world.’’25 In other
words, not what befalls us from outside determines affectivity but rather affectivity in its
self-relation interior to itself first makes possible any experience of what might befall us.
That all dispositions, feelings, etc. here are given to themselves without the possibility of
recoil in their ‘‘being-always-already-given-to-themselves,’’ ‘‘crucified’’ on themselves,
as Jad Hatem puts it,26 implies that they bear the character of suffering. That said it is not
23 Concerning this discussion on individualization, see Ku¨hn (2006).
24 For this reason, Henry describes, to use the language employed in recent discussions about the status
of consciousness and self-consciousness, a form of pre-reflexive self-consciousness referred to as a ‘sense
of self’. Cf. Zahavi (2005, pp. 106, 116).
25 Tengelyi (2009, p. 403); cf. Henry (1973, pp. 616–617).
26 Hatem (2005, p. 254).
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the case that life only suffers in such feelings and dispositions. Henry understands
suffering rather as a ‘‘path’’. Inasmuch as it surpasses itself to ‘‘return’’ home to itself,
this ‘‘being-itself,’’ its self-givenness, is also a fount of pleasure and joy that never runs
dry. Power and impotence are thus intertwined in this interior experience of a ‘‘gift
which cannot be refused,’’27 and so draws life from the auto-donation of life inside the
ego as a ‘‘primordial force’’ or ‘‘drive,’’ both words deployed by Henry himself. This
process of arriving at itself (venue en soi), this gift of life (don de la vie) that can never be
refused, Henry understands as the gift of absolute life, which, traditionally speaking, we
would call God. The ‘‘transcendental birth’’ of the living (le vivant) in (absolute) Life
therefore in no way describes a factual genesis or individuation, but rather a conditio: it
concerns the conditio of sonship, as Henry notes in his Christological transformation of
his major phenomenological intuition in I am the Truth:
To understand man on the basis of Christ, who is himself understood on the
basis of God, in turn rests on the crucial intuition of a radical phenomenology
of life, which is precisely that of Christianity: namely, that Life has the same
meaning for God, for Christ, and for man. This is so because there is but a
single and selfsame essence of life, and, more radically, a single and selfsame
life. This life—that self-generates itself in God and that, in its self-generation,
generates the transcendental Arch-son as the essential Ipseity in which this
self-generation comes about—is the Life from which man himself takes his
transcendental birth, precisely since he is Life and is explicitly defined as such
within Christianity. He is the Son of this unique and absolute Life, and thus the
Son of God.28
This Trinitarian conception of the self-engendering of absolute life, and of the
generation that takes place within the Trinity of a ‘‘first living being’’ (i.e., Christ),
through which generation this absolute Life realizes itself, and finally this
conception of the generation of each living being (individual) in and through this
Life, reaches a Christological apex: the ‘‘first living being’’ born in perfect
reciprocity with absolute Life Christ represents for Henry that primordial or ‘‘older
ipseity’’ of a ‘‘First Self’’29 through which alone each living being can obtain the
unrefusable gift of life.30
Henry’s turn to Christology as a way to explicate life’s living relation to
humanity should not be dismissed as a theological domestication of phenomenol-
ogy. Viewed phenomenologically, we see that he forges a noteworthy modification
of the concept of self-affection. Henry seems to be responding to the critical charge
27 Henry (1973, p. 475).
28 Henry (2003a, p. 101).
29 Henry (2003a, pp. 115, 262).
30 On the self-generation of Life as the generation of the ‘‘First Living’’, cf. Henry (2003a); on the
generation of the living being as the ‘‘Son of God’’ or the ‘‘Son within the Son’’, cf. Henry (ibid, chapters
6 and 7); on reciprocity, or, as the case may be, asymmetry as the decisive relations of this inner-
Trinitarian process, which Henry utilizes to think the phenomenality of Life, cf. Rivera (2011). That
Henry’s christological position is already adumbrated very early in L’essence de la manifestation,
particularly in his interpretation of Eckhart, has been shown by Gondek and Tengelyi (2010, pp. 365 ff.);
James G. Hart offers a critical reading, indebted to Husserls phenomenology, in Hart (1998).
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made against his theory of auto-affection, namely, that pure immanence possesses
no structure or history and therefore it excludes every possible relation to otherness,
as well as every source of hetero-affection.31 On the contrary, Henry introduces the
distinction between a strong, absolute, or naturalizing self-affection, on the one
hand, and a weak, relative, or naturalized self-affection, on the other hand.
The singular Self that I am experiences itself only within the movement by
which Life is cast into itself and enjoys itself in the eternal process of its
absolute self-affecting. The singular Self self-affects itself; it is the identity
between the affecting and the affected, but it has not itself laid down this
identity. The Self self-affects itself only inasmuch as absolute Life is self-
affected in this Self. It is Life, in its self-giving, which gives the Self to itself. It
is Life, in its self-revelation, that reveals the Self to itself.32
Although we cannot discuss the Christological transformation of Henry’s thought in
more detail here, the following point seems to have a particularly salient
significance for our context: according to Henry, the experience that life has of
itself takes place in connection with the aforementioned pathic duality of suffering
and enjoyment, i.e., the ‘‘antinomic structure of life’’.33 Inasmuch as this ‘‘antinomy
of the fundamental affective tonalities’’34 of Suffering and Joy is ‘‘co-constitutive of
life’s self-revelation’’ and thus ‘‘refers back to a primitive unity,’’ it constitutes
selfhood, or, as Henry also puts it, ipseity. In other words, since human life is given
to itself in its pure passivity, it is not self-positing or self-subsisting and thus not
‘‘the source’’ of its own condition as living—rather Henry insists that I ‘‘find
myself’’ thrown into life, self-affected, as he articulates it in I am the Truth.35 Ipseity
is thus neither absolute self-affection, nor does it result from the impersonal
execution of anonymous forces or drives.36 Ipseity so understood by Henry means
having a self to the extent that life in its self-affection surpasses itself into ‘‘affective
formations’’ and thus transforms itself by way of that affectivity, i.e., insofar as in
the originary affectivity of feeling-itself it also experiences the essence of its
subjectivity. Insofar as ipseity carries the burden of feeling-itself and, in its
condition as son, experiences it as the burden of its own given being, it comes into
‘‘possession of itself and of each of the modalities of its life’’37—and, hence,
becomes the subject that takes up a relation to the world.
31 This critique recurs in different variations. Cf. in addition to B. Waldenfels’ critique which we will cite
later, Janicaud (2000).
32 Henry (2003a, p. 107).
33 On the structure of this antinomy, cf. Henry (2003a, pp. 198–200).
34 Henry (2003a, p. 107).
35 Henry (2003a, p. 107).
36 See Audi (2006, pp. 204–5), Gondek and Tengelyi (2010, pp. 130 ff.).
37 Henry (2003a, p. 200).
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2 On the crisis of the cultural reality
To shed light on the innovative significance of his practical philosophy, we must
develop a deeper understanding of how Henry thinks the aforementioned relation to
the world. It concerns—and this is crucial to note—a ‘‘world,’’ which would not be
the pre-given aim that is exterior to the self-movement of life. For Henry, ‘‘world’’
is not to be understood in the traditional sense of ‘‘the totality of all things’’, nor is
it to be taken phenomenologically as the ‘‘horizon of horizons,’’ nor is it even
the ‘‘medium of care.’’ With the term ‘‘flesh’’ (chair) Henry designates—in sharp
contrast to late Merleau-Ponty who takes it to represent the common milieu of
subject and object—an immanent arch-praxis, that is, the transcendental ‘‘I can’’ of
the subject. In the phenomenality of this ‘‘I can’’ world-content and the execution
of our potentialities are inextricably bound together at the basic level of our
transcendental affectivity prior to the display of the world:
If the world is everywhere unrelenting, if the fabric of the sensible is
perpetuated without fail or lacuna and it does not come unraveled at any point,
if every fiber and every grain of which it is composed are interminably
evocable, it is because every one of the capacities (pouvoirs) that lead me to
them is the power of a flesh nothing is able to divide (se´pare de soi), that is
always present to itself in a memory without diversion, without thought,
without a past, without memory—in its immemorial memory. It is my flesh
that is indivisible (inde´chirable). The unity of the world is thus an immanent
unity, it lies in the parousia of my flesh.38
The concrete experience of the world thus ‘‘demands,’’ Henry concludes, ‘‘as its
ultimate possibility, a consciousness without world, an acosmic flesh.’’39 By this he
understands, following Maine de Biran, the ‘‘immanent corporeality’’ of our ‘‘I
can’’. This ‘‘transcendental I can’’ is to be thought as a living ability given to us, a
capacity that first and foremost makes possible the unlimited repetition of our
concrete capacities.40 The task of unfolding the auto-affective structure of life thus
is assigned to the flesh as the material concretion of the self-givenness of our
innermost selfhood, i.e., ipseity. The flesh accomplishes, as it were, its translation
into ‘‘affective formations’’ and therefore embodies ‘‘the fundamental habitus of
transcendental life,’’41 which make up the ‘‘life-world’’ as a world of life in its
innermost essence.42
38 Henry (2000, pp. 207–208).
39 Henry (2000, p. 208).
40 Cf. Henry (2000, pp. 227–228).
41 Henry (2003a, p. 250). A study of such transcendental habitus and its affective phenomenological
genesis in life is offered by Ge´ly (2007).
42 If nothing else this implies a revolutionary reorientation of the so-called problematic of intersub-
jectivity, that no longer proceeds from the givenness of the ego, but rather from the aforementioned
‘‘condition of sonship’’ as a ‘‘preunifying essence’’ (Henry 2003a, p. 257). Henry carries this theme
further in Incarnation in the context of a rereading of the concept of ‘‘the mystical body of Christ’’ (cf.




With this we have a further indication of how transcendence (i.e., the world) arising
from immanence (i.e., life) is to be understood then as something other than a ‘‘non
really included’’43 transcendence (Transzendenz irreellen Beschlossenseins)—
namely, as ‘‘affective formation’’, ‘‘condensation’’, or even as the ‘‘immemorial
memory’’ of our flesh. Yet might these descriptions of life’s self-movement be
represented more precisely? How are we to think Henry’s claim that ‘‘the world’s
reality has nothing to do with its truth, with its way of showing, with the ‘outside’ of a
horizon, with any objectivity’’?—how are we to think that the ‘‘reality that constitutes
the world’s content is life’’?44 Viewed against this background, Henry’s theory of the
duplicity of appearing ostensibly leads to a seemingly insurmountable problem: how
can the notion of an ‘‘acosmic flesh’’ in its ‘‘radical independence’’45 as the sole reality
of life actually found that which is outside of it, the world? It is precisely this that we
must now reflect on more explicitly if we wish to show that his approach can be made
useful for problems that arise in the philosophy of society and culture as well as the
questions posed by political philosophy. The main objection to Henry’s reinscription
of the world within life proceeds in the following way: the ‘‘counter-reduction’’ aims
to found the visible display of the world in the invisible self-revelation of absolute life,
yet doesn’t this disqualification of the world set into operation a ‘‘complete scorn for
all of life’s actual determinations’’46 in the world? With this all too radical inquiry into
the originary do we not become trapped in a ‘‘mysticism of immanence,’’ that remains
enclosed in its own night, forever incapable of being expressed and coming into the
world? To summarize Bernhard Waldenfels’ exemplary formulation of this critique,
‘‘doesn’t the negative characterization of self-affection as non-intentional, non-
representational, and non-sighted or non-ecstatic bear a constant reference to the
world-relation (Weltbezug) that it suspends?’’47,48
Henry would reply firmly in the negative to this question. On the contrary, he
would posit that only a non-intentional phenomenology is capable of grounding the
reality of the world, as a living reality that has nothing to do with its objective
truth—i.e., with the truth as we express it in the world. This is certainly not meant to
imply that our life brings forth the concrete content of the world, but rather simply
that the lived intelligibility of such content is ontologically possible only as living
content. In other words, its intelligibility rests on nothing other than the variation,
transformation, and augmentation of those concrete individual potentialities that are
at work in advance of its worldly appearing. According to Henry, Husserl was
completely aware of this, however he failed to follow through on this insight:
Husserl’s phenomenology has not disregarded the non-intentional. On the
contrary, it has designated the non-intentional qua hyle´ as a fundamental
43 Husserl (1960, p. 26).
44 Henry (2003a, p. 107).
45 Henry (1973, p. 130).
46 Janicaud (2000, p. 78).
47 Waldenfels (1998, pp. 41–2).
48 Doesn’t the subjectivity, whose parousia is thought here, thus embody that ‘‘beautiful soul’’ whose
‘‘transparent purity’’ and lack of relation to the world that Hegel reproached Christianity for? (Hegel
1988, p. 236).
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stratum of consciousness. […] Nevertheless this decisive function of the
primary impression that would make of hyletic phenomenology the funda-
mental discipline of phenomenology becomes immediately overturned. The
hyle´ is nothing more than matter for a form that alone has the power of
illuminating it and of making of it a phenomenon, and this form that sheds
light on it is intentionality. Thus the original essence of phenomenality as
revelation of the impression qua impression, that is, its impressionality, or
rather its affectivity, is concealed. […] With this concealment of the secret
source and original essence of phenomenality at the hands of ecstatic
phenomenality, it is nothing less than the concrete life of men that is carried
away from the domain of philosophical thought, and away from that thinking
which is opened up by phenomenology itself to exteriority and ultimately to a
ruinous objectivism that is covered over by the objectivism of Galilean
science—which was defined by its exclusion of subjectivity, that is, of life.49
Henry’s criticism of Husserl notwithstanding, this quote shows the extent to which his
work is to be understood as a continuation of the Husserlian crisis-diagnosis.50 Indeed
it should be noted that ‘‘objectivism’’ here should not be taken to mean only a reduction
to the finality of the objective sciences inaugurated by Galileo (and the loss of their
significance for life to which it necessarily leads), which Husserl reproaches for being
a ‘‘weary’’ form of reason.51 ‘‘Objectivism’’ designates here rather the underlying self-
conception of the human being as subject in light of ‘‘ontological monism,’’ given that
such a self-conception still underlies the procedure of these sciences and is authorized
anew by classical phenomenology. The human being, insofar as he or she is reduced to
the subject of self-knowledge or to self-regarding care (Sorge), is subjected to a
systematic elimination of his transcendental humanitas. It is therefore this transcen-
dental humanitas that Henry names the field of invisible appearing that makes possible
the ego’s praxis in the luminosity of the world. So understood, Henry does not
eliminate the world as a field of appearing. He rather insists that there is a duplicity of
appearing, i.e., both visible world and the invisible transcendental ipseity are qualified
by its living auto-affection. It is only when the field of appearing is reduced to the world
alone that phenomenology gives way to a barbaric character, eradicating the invisible
life in which each ipseity takes hold of its life. Thus, in contrast to other analyses of
barbarism, Henry does not speak in La barbarie of Auschwitz, the Gulag or other cases
of genocide. The barbarism that he has in mind concerns rather a self-destructive
reduction of human knowledge, which, according to him, made these twentieth-
century catastrophes possible in the first place: scientism. By scientism Henry
understands the view that ‘‘there exists no mode of knowing other than Galilean
science, that is to say, modern physics.’’52 Following the presupposition shared even
by the humanities of a universal abstraction of all subjective qualities, we
consequently find that our knowledge of the human being becomes circumscribed
49 Henry (2003b, p. 117).
50 Cf. Hart (1999).
51 Husserl (1970, p. 299).
52 Henry (2003a, p. 260).
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entirely within the display of the world, its exterior objectivity, its ‘‘truth.’’ In this
context, Henry’s critique of culture is not merely concerned with the ‘‘forgetfulness of
the life-world’’ nor the one-dimensionality of technology as framing (Gestell) and its
resulting ethical problems, which dominate philosophical discourse today. These
problems are thoroughly thematized in his recurring and decidedly conservative
critique of culture.53 At its core, Henry’s analysis aims at nothing other than the
possibility of a destruction of life by means of itself, a possibility that underlies all these
manifestations of crisis and becomes more or less deliberately exploited by such
crises.
Henry’s thesis implies that the germ of all barbarism lies in a self-destruction of life.
The possibility that life may wish to destroy itself is no way obvious as already a
cursory look at the philosophical tradition that extends from Spinoza through Hegel
and up to Nietzsche and Heidegger shows. According to Henry, however, this
possibility is indeed constitutive for life and is based on its duplicity. In order to
understand this possibility it is necessary to examine the dynamic in which life in its
affects is driven against itself, i.e., the irreducible arch-passive self-givenness of life.
As to Henry, this passivity of life vis-a`-vis itself, which, as we have said, is the germ of
its augmentation and therefore the condition of any kind of culture, can lead life to turn
against itself. Under what conditions, however, is this possible? Under the condition
that it becomes no longer capable in itself to be augmented, under the condition that it
is not adequate to the task of implementing the ground of its being, for such
implementation belongs to its essence:
The assertion that life experiences itself (s’e´prouve soi-meˆme) implies that it is
passive vis-a`-vis itself and consequently vis-a`-vis a foundation that sustains it
[…] Thence, there is room for a meditation or an effort that seeks to feel this
foundation of Being within us more lively.54
Religion, mysticism, art, ethics, and rational knowledge but also the refined
fulfillment of our most basic needs are exemplary cases in the realm of culture of the
self-augmenting articulation of the ‘‘excessive’’ nature of life, i.e., its irreducibly
antinomic nature. Thus, what is at play for Henry in these ‘‘symbolic institutions’’55
is in no way merely the pre-scientific validity of subjective experience in contrast to
the objectivism of the scientific worldview. At play rather is the innermost essence
of this experience itself qua ‘‘cultural life-praxis’’ that expresses the excessive
nature of life without ‘‘displacing life in what is outside life.’’56 Henry’s critique of
traditional philosophical accounts of culture thus focuses on their tendency to regard
culture as a means to expend or objectify life’s energy in worldly products. Hence,
53 Cf., for example, Henry (2002).
54 Henry (1987).
55 The concept of ‘‘symbolic institution’’ goes back to M. Merleau-Ponty and is meant to designate
‘‘those events in experience which endow it with durable dimensions, in relation to which a whole series
of other experiences will acquire meaning, will form an intelligible series or a history—or again those
events which sediment in me a meaning, not just as a survival or residue, but as the invitation to sequel,
the necessity of a future.’’ (Merleau-Ponty 1988, pp. 108–109). As Tengelyi (2007) argues, this concept
can serve as a basic concept to develop an inherently phenomenological theory of culture.
56 Hart (1999, p. 260).
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Henry’s task is not, as in Husserl, to unveil the ‘‘history of institutions’’57
(Stiftungsgeschichte) that concretely articulates the symbolic matrices of our various
socio-cultural life-worlds.58 For Henry it is rather a matter of inquiring into the
originary passivity of life as that which in its very pathetic self-movement oscillates
between the self-delighting capacity for living and the self-agonizing wish to live no
longer, but which will never be able to escape from this movement. On these
premises it can be established that what scientism or the ‘‘scientific knowing’’
attempts to flee when it excludes the concrete field of invisible display internal to
the ego, or what we attempt to flee when we pretend to live out our subjective
potentialities by appealing to ‘‘ideal entities,’’ is the self-experiencing (e´preuve de
soi) that necessarily involves the self-agonizing aspect of life.59
This flight from the invisible sphere of life into the exterior world of history and
temporality however effectively takes on monstrous forms when life strives to sever
itself from itself in order to bring this flight to its injurious yet unreachable end:
The leap outside of the self is a flight into exteriority in which it is a matter of
fleeing oneself and thus of ridding oneself of what one is, that is, of the burden
(poids) of this malaise and suffering. However, this flight remains caught in its
own pathos. Thus there remains only one way out: in order to destroy purely
and simply this malaise and this suffering of which we cannot be rid, which
indeed have their possibility in our self-experience (le s’e´prouve soi-meˆme)
and thus in life, life itself, its proper essence, must be terminated. This self-
destruction is bound to be just as unsuccessful in its aim (fins) as is self-flight
if it is true that the act of self-destruction is only possible on the condition that
it actualizes and affirms the essence that it wishes to annihilate.60
Life preserves itself even in its intention to destroy itself. Barbarism, says Henry, is
an ‘‘idle energy’’,61 an energy that no longer traverses the suffering proper to it for
the sake of augmenting itself. Out of this unbearable situation of life, which in its
attempt to destroy itself cannot leave itself behind, results a fury of ‘‘self-flight.’’
The flight of the self is the title under which almost everything that passes
before our eyes is arranged. Not science in itself, which as knowledge of the
57 Husserl applies this concept, in addition, to the characterization of the genetic acquisition of egoic
apperception structures (see Husserl 2001, p. 268), in the sense it takes on in the framework of his
‘‘generative analyses’’ in the ambit of his crisis writings where he describes the dynamic of generative
meaning-formation (cf. Husserl 1993, p. 62).
58 For this reason, already in Husserl, in my view, we see the possibility that the meaning of such a
history cannot be traced back to an unanimous Urstiftung or one identical Endstiftung, nor, moreover, can
it ultimately be conceived teleologically or archeologically; a possibility however that Husserl could not
pursue further.
59 Henry addresses this substitution in his book on Marx, in which he demonstrates that Marx’s
‘‘transcendental view’’ of society and economy serves to show that the living, or, as Marx says, ‘‘actual
work’’ (wirkliche Arbeit) is the irreducible practical basis not only of the irreal representatives of the
economy but also of the economic itself, that is, he reminds us that work itself is not the economic (see
Henry 1991).
60 Henry (2008a, pp. 185–186).
61 Henry (2008a, p. 284).
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nature that it defines in its procedures is completely positive but […] the belief
that this Galilean science of nature constitutes the sole possible way of
knowing, the sole truth, so that there is no other reality, as true reality, i.e., real
reality, than the object of this science, such that man himself is not real except
under this title and such that all knowledge that concerns him can only be a
mode or form of this particular science. An ideology—scientism and
positivism—has here become substituted for science.62
In no way does self-flight take place merely at the theoretical level. In the wake of this
self-flight, which sets into motion scientism’s tendency to systematically put life out of
play, we see a proliferation of barbaric practices, in which life is ‘‘expelled from
itself.’’63 Henry identifies several such practices, from the depreciation of life in social
engineering, scientific practice and the tele-technological imaging and simulation of
life to the destruction of the university. What is common to these practices is that they
create an ‘‘inhuman world’’64—that is, a world that is ‘‘perpetually external’’—whose
truth disposes of the actuality of the life that makes it possible. In such practices, life is
subjected to a fundamental ontological shock, for it becomes the object of a perpetual
simulation of life. For this reason, however, a form of life is established in which
‘‘communication becomes its content’’,65 and consequently a culture from which the
‘‘culture of life’’ is excluded, and, to put it in Nietzsche’s words, is sacrificed in view of
the ‘‘great hunt’’66 for the truth of the world:
The world in fact is a milieu of pure exteriority. Everything that finds within it
the condition of its being is never offered as anything but external-being, a
section of exteriority, a surface, a shoreline given over to our regard and upon
which our regard glides indefinitely without being able to penetrate the inside
of that which is concealed from view behind each new aspect, fac¸ade, and
screen. For this being which is nothing other than exteriority has no interior,
its law is becoming, the incessant outcropping of new faces and new planes
and knowledge tracks this succession of lures, each of which presents itself to
knowledge only to immediately cover over a being it does not possess and to
redirect knowledge to another lure that does the same. No interior: nothing
that is living, that can speak in its proper name, in the name of what it
experiences, in the name of what it is. They can speak only in the name of
‘‘things,’’ only in the name of death: in advance of the world and its ecstatic
disclosure what exhibits itself and ex-poses itself is only the always-at-hand,
the always-outside—the object.67
This ‘‘ontological lie’’ about life situates life entirely within the horizon of the world
and its objectivity thereby unveiling not life but, in fact, death. The ‘‘debacle of
62 Henry (2008a, p. 186).
63 Henry (2008a, p. 190).
64 Henry (2008a, p. 210).
65 Henry (2008a, p. 238).
66 Nietzsche (1998, p. 43, § 45).
67 Henry (2008a, p. 36).
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humanism in all its forms’’68 is, according to Henry, thus nothing other than the
necessary consequence of this barbarism that is internal to the modern spirit, which
still calls for a defense of a genuine humanity precisely where it has already
degraded humanity to a lifeless copy, that is, to an automaton.69
3 The political and the temptations of transcendence
The barbarism of which Henry bespeaks is not only a crisis of culture in the sense of
a self-destruction of those ‘‘practical laws’’ in accordance with which the self-
augmentation of subjective potentialities is actualized. On the contrary, the logic of
barbarism is also operative in the political domain. Nowhere is this exhibited more
clearly than in the catastrophes of twentieth-century European politics. Henry
examines this ‘‘form’’ of barbarism in his book, Du communisme au capitalisme:
The´orie d’une catastrophe. I highlight here only its broad argument: fascism and
totalitarianism succeed in leading the living to negate themselves in their own
ineluctable lives in order to induce them to destroy others in violence:
Let’s say simply here that never can life as such be the origin of crime, that is,
of an act turned against itself, unless it engages in the monstrous process of
self-negation, which will be the distinctive trait of nihilism and fascism.70
Life’s ontological self-flight, as Henry has paradigmed it in La barbarie, is thus
treated in light of its political manifestation, or what Henry calls the hypostasis of
the political. This consists in the application of the political as a universal, on the
basis of which each individual can both be certain of his own particularity and yet
be damned to experience himself in his nullity vis-a`-vis the universal. In other
words, the hypostasis of the political is quite literally the exaltation of the political
to the status of a real being. Thus viewed, the hypostasis of the political severs the
connection to the immanent realization of life on the part of individuals along with
their ‘‘pathic intersubjectivity,’’ and this severing subjects living beings and their
invisible relations to each other to the judgment of the visible gaze of the state
(which is epitomized in Hegel’s notion of the ‘‘light of the state’’ (Staatslicht):
The individual is nothing other than the occupant of a place delimited by the
ensemble of processes that constitute the substance of society and being taken
into account as such, as the affair of civitas, is what defines the political. The
political is everything, the individual is nothing.71
68 Henry (2003a, p. 265).
69 In I am the Truth, Henry will take this up in a discussion of the Anti-Christ motif. For with Henry we
can ask, what is the automaton other than the ‘‘statue of the Beast’’ (Revelation 13:14; cf. Henry 2003a,
pp. 268–269), which—to put it in the words of Henry—stands for the belief that no transcendental Self is
required to experience oneself, that, thus, no one has to be posited in his conditioning, nor does one
require the mediation of Christ in the sense of the First-Living.
70 Henry (1990, p. 89).
71 Henry (2004a, p. 161).
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The debasement of the individual defines, for Henry, the core of fascism, its attack
on life as such, which is carried out not only directly but structurally.
Fascism always implies the debasement of the individual and, at the bottom of
this will to debasement, there lies the will to deny it. This negation of the
individual is what allows fascism to appear from the outset as a force of
death—but who is the individual we are speaking of here? Under what aspect
or in what part of his being must this be directed, attained and precisely
negated so that we can speak of fascism? In what makes him a living being
[…], it is where the individual is an individual, where he is this singular
individual, in his life, that fascism strikes. […] And it is in this that fascism is
veritably a force of death.72
Fascism attacks life by seeking to throw life outside itself into the sphere of
contingent objectivity whereas in reality life’s essence appears to itself, is given to
itself and is manifest to itself by experiencing itself on the basis of its primordial
arch-passivity. Fascism as Henry conceives it is an attack on the phenomenological
essence of absolute life that constitutes every living. We are thus confronted with
the groundlessness of the hypostasis of the political that is rendered visible in the
institution of fascism, its phantasmatic incarnation in the ‘‘body of a people’’ (or
even in a ‘‘class-consciousness,’’ etc.).
If a people has its reality in the individual, the negation of the individual is in
truth a self-negation. The time of the political is the time of despair, the
moment when life, or the individual, no longer believing in themselves and
wishing to flee themselves, throw themselves outside of themselves and
plunge into everything that could motivate such a flight and notably political
existence, an existence devoted to the public cause (chose), to history, to
society and its problems, and to everything that permits the individual to no
longer live his own life and to forget himself.73
Yet, according to Henry, it is not only in the ‘‘hypostasis of the political’’ indicative
of real existing socialism or fascism that the groundlessness of the political can
appear. Doubtless there are totalitarian ideologies that can be understood to have
instrumentalized man’s fear of the groundlessness of communal being-together,
insofar as they project this fear onto the ontological inconsistency of the very
individual that has been constructed by them.74 However, democracy, too, can fall
prey to the hypostasis of the political. And so the collapse of totalitarian political
systems should not detract, Henry so argues, from the ever-present reality that
democracy can enlist state-sanctioned violence in its own interest to protect its
boundaries against individuals.
72 Henry (1990. p. 94).
73 Henry (2004a, p. 162).
74 It is impossible to deal here with the respective thesis, i.e., that the success of totalitarianisms consists
in the exploitation of the embodied subject’s ontological weakness; cf., however, the diverse accounts on
this by Bergoffen (1990) and Rogozinski (1994–1995).
From the ‘‘metaphysics of the individual’’ to the critique of society 355
123
According to Henry, the breakdown of democracy here is based not on
contingent but indeed undoubtedly alarming events. This is also true in the case of
the (seemingly unavoidable) self-legitimating ‘‘caprice’’ of the self-elected elite or
the ‘‘incompetence’’ of the political representatives,75 which may ultimately be
excluded as a sufficient reason for a definitive failure in the context of procedural
democracies. For Henry, the decisive question concerns rather the fact that the
democratic itself lacks grounding. What he interrogates is the foundation of
democracy itself, namely, the freedom and equality of individuals, as they are
determined by ‘‘human rights.’’ As he explains, human rights do not represent a
formal principle. On the contrary, they make up the core of what one understands by
‘‘material democracy.’’ More precisely, this signifies that they should not be
understood as ‘‘procedurally entitled attributes,’’ since on these premises they can,
in principle, also be legitimately negated.76 From this reflection it follows that
democracy ultimately cannot discover its principle within itself (with respect to
human rights Levinas speaks of an ‘‘extra-territorial claim’’): for ‘‘how can what lies
before every decision result from this (sc. extra-territorial claim), how can it be
founded on it?’’77 Yet according to Henry this objection does not arise by chance,
but rather follows, as he notes, from the concept of political representation.
In order to fulfill the democratic principle, political representation was
invented, but political representation [as the substitution of individuals by
delegates; MS] is the negation of the democratic principle.78
This line of inquiry opens up a field of enormous scope with respect to the political,
for it implies the fundamental question of whether or not the basic values of
democracy can be grounded, and if so, how, politically, ethically, or religiously. For
Henry, the grounding of democracy can only be thought along ethical lines. The
ethical, however, in relation to the essence of life—understood even as the
unrefusable gift of a supreme power, i.e., as the ‘‘transcendental birth’’ of our ‘‘I
can,’’ which is born out of the hyper-power of absolute life (hyper-pouvoir de la
vie)—is synonymous with the religious. Religious and so-called ‘‘primitive’’
societies would have known, says Henry, about this supreme power: they lived with
the fundamental life-knowledge that man is not his own ground; they lived this
knowledge culturally, in art for instance, which was thus always religious. The
‘‘elimination’’ of the last religious societies in the West, the Christian society, which
thinks the absolute as Life, was, according to Henry, the natural result following
upon the new science that Galileo set into operation, ‘‘which places life out of play
75 Henry (2004a, p. 162).
76 Cf. (Henry 2004a, p. 172).
77 Henry (2004a); cf. Henry (1990, p, 180). In political theory this thesis is known as the so-called
‘‘Bo¨ckenfo¨rde-Paradoxon:’’ ‘‘The free, secularized state lives off presuppositions that it cannot itself
avouch.’’ (Bo¨ckenfo¨rde 1976, p. 60); Levinas also speaks on this: ‘‘These rights of man, that do not need
to be conferred, are thus irrevocable and inalienable. Rights that, independently of any conferral, express
the alterity or absolute of every person, the suspension of all reference: a violent tearing loose from the
determining order of nature and the social structure in which each of us is obviously involved […]’’
(Levinas 1993, p. 117).
78 Henry (2004b, p. 172).
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in favor of the material universe.’’79 This Galilean reduction takes place especially
where, as we saw, the democratic principle forms a fateful ‘‘alliance’’ with it.80
Because for a social organization that seeks to discover the principle of its organization
in itself the ostensibly transcendent origin of the ethical–political must necessarily
appear as extrinsic to the political domain itself, as if imposed from the outside, i.e., as
an inadmissible exteriority (exte´riorite´ irrecevable). The democratic principle here
defined props up a political system, as history makes evident, contradictory to the
sacredness of life as it is expressed in Henry’s concept of the transcendental field of
absolute life that gives birth to each of us as living ipseities. This transcendental field
interior to the ego finds no place in a political domain funded by Galilean science, and
indeed life can never do so. The reason it cannot do so is because the categories of
freedom and equality so cherished by democracy are what Henry calls empty concepts.
What Henry conveys by labeling them as empty is the fact that they fail to render
intelligible the irrefusable gift of life by which each living self is co-original within a
primordial ‘‘co-pathetic collectivity’’ that precedes any possible symbolic institution
of the ‘‘social bond.’’ It is no surprise, then, that Henry claims that the consequences for
our late modern societies are disastrous given that they possess an ethos preoccupied
with modern science, individual freedom and exterior display. Henry formulates the
consequences in what follows, even if polemically:
In fact, from the moment scientific knowledge is taken as the only true
knowledge and the Galilean field of the material universe that it apprehends is
taken as the sole reality, then what does not appear in such a field—absolute
Life, which experiences itself outside the world, the Ipseity of this life that is
its ‘‘experience of self,’’ any transcendental Self drawing its essence from this
Ipseity […]. ‘The death of God,’ a dramatic leitmotif of modern thought
attributed to some audacious philosophical breakthrough and parroted by our
contemporaries, is just the declaration of intent of the modern mind and its flat
positivism. But because this death of God destroys the interior possibility of
man, since no man is possible who is not first a living Self and a ‘me’, it strikes
at the very heart of man himself.81
From this insight into the true nature of the ‘‘death of God’’ as the distinguishing
feature of the modern crisis of the subject ensues one of Henry’s further cardinal
insights—namely, the insight into the loss of an originary ethos, an ‘‘ethos in
accordance with life’s self-giving’’82:
This is why, as soon as this condition fails to appear, the imprescriptible love
of others also disappears. The other is now just another person, a person as
people are […]. Forgetful of their veritable condition and the other’s veritable
condition, they behave toward themselves and others as mere people. Then the
whole edifying morality that wishes to found itself on the mere person, on the
79 Henry (2004b, p. 170).
80 Henry (2004b, p. 175).
81 Henry (2003a, p. 265).
82 See on this conception of the ethos Ku¨hn (1998).
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rights of man, discovers its emptiness, its prescriptions are flouted, and the
world is given over to horror and sordid exploitation, to massacres and
genocides. It is not by chance that in the twentieth century the disappearance
of ‘religious’ morality has given rise not to a new morality, a ‘secular
morality’, albeit a morality without any definite foundation, but to the
downfall of any morality and to the terrifying and yet daily spectacle of that
downfall.83
4 Concluding remarks
What I have tried to underline in the preceding reflections is the unfathomed fact
that the ‘‘immanent teleology of life’’—its tendency as a force to incessantly surpass
itself—at the moment when it runs dry and remains idle, or is reduced to ‘‘natural
needs,’’ ultimately turns against itself and others, qua projections of the self-
reproach of the alienated self. For such ‘‘empty subjectivity’’ remains, as Henry
notes, an ‘‘avid subjectivity.’’84 Even when life is reduced ideologically or
scientifically it does not cease living. As ‘‘empty,’’ however, it is not only in an avid
way that subjectivity escapes into ever new representations of life—in particular
medially and procedurally generated representations—as well as into certain
representations of ‘‘itself as an other’’. In fact, subjectivity becomes ensnared in this
self-flight and, at once, falls ever deeper into the fear of being nothing—a fear, with
which subjectivity copes only by means of projecting itself precisely into these
representations of an absent life—those transcendence-surrogates or ‘‘yet unex-
plored possibilities,’’ of which Nietzsche spoke.85 The ‘‘true transcendence,’’ ‘‘the
immanence of life in every living being,’’86 falls prey to a forgetting that, according
to Henry, is in fact transcendental.87 Such a self-forgetting on the part of life,
however, does not therefore merely represent a negation of life but in fact is an
expression of life itself. When Henry speaks of a ‘‘second birth’’ that is supposed to
set us free,88 we are nevertheless left to wonder if he has not hereby precisely
broken up the ‘‘unshakable positivity’’89 of life—i.e., the essential duplicity of
appearing—and thereby effaced the self’s place in the world, giving the impression
that the interior self is to be privileged at the expense of the self’s creative activity in
the exterior world.
In transcendence, it is hence necessary to vindicate the life that apprehends itself
in immanence, as nothing more but also nothing less than a ‘‘biotope.’’90 Hence we
must understand the self-forgetting of life as its transcendental condition of
83 Henry (2003a, p. 257).
84 Henry (1990, p. 222).
85 Nietzsche (1998, p. 43; § 45).
86 Henry (2000, p. 176).
87 On the complex topos of forgetting in Henry, see Steinbock (1999).
88 Henry (2003a, pp. 152–170 and esp. p. 270).
89 Henry (2008b, p. 97).
90 I take this concept from Longneaux (2001).
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possibility. The last words of Christ, as they are transmitted through the Gospel of
Matthew, also testify to this idea: ‘‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’’
In them a kenotic truth of the world is expressed, for which we as living beings have
to assume responsibility, as Jan Patocka argues in a commentary on Christ’s words:
There is nothing mystical here. I would say that it is in fact very simple. ‘Why
have you forsaken me?’ – the answer lies in the question. What would have
happened if you hadn’t forsaken me? Nothing. Something can happen only if
you abandon me. He who sacrifices himself must go all the way to the end. He
is ‘forsaken’ precisely so that there will be nothing there, nothing he can cling
to. No thing – but this does not mean that this nothing does not in fact contain
the whole, das All, in the words of the poet.91
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